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Abstract. Large transportation projects such as highways are expensive, complex, and dynamic in nature. 
Acquiring large investment capitals for these projects is always a major challenge for every nation. To solve 
this problem, Vietnamese government has called for the participation of private entities in the form of public-
private partnership (PPP). Attracting private investors is a vital and challenging step for implementing PPP 
transportation projects in Vietnam. This paper examines the similarities and differences of risk perceptions 
of the public and private sectors for the investment of PPP transportation projects in Vietnam. Questionnaire 
surveys are used to collect data for assessing the likelihoods of occurrence and impacts of risk factors from 
123 experienced professionals from both public and private entities. We found that the two most critical risk 
factors (CRFs) are land acquisition and compensation, and delay in project approvals and permits. The results 
from an independent sample t-test indicate the different risk perceptions of the public and private sectors for 
eight CRFs: (1) corruption, (2) change of project scope, (3) lack of transparency in bidding, (4) inflation, (5) 
payment issues, (6) inadequate feasibility study, (7) inappropriate allocation of responsibility and risk, and (8) 
fluctuation of interest rate. These eight CRFs are categorized into three major groups: the tendering process, 
commercial problems, and payment issues. These results can be used for establishing appropriate public 
policies to promote private investments in PPP transportation projects. Meanwhile, private investors would 
also have a better understanding of PPP transportation project development in Vietnam. 
 
Keywords: Critical risk factor (CRF), public-private partnership (PPP), risk perceptions, risk 
management, transportation projects, Vietnam. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Since Vietnam has become a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2006, international capital 
investments have been increasing enormously, especially in the construction sector. This plays a vital role in 
the nation’s economic development. In parallel with the rapid economic growth, the demand for 
infrastructures has also been escalating in recent years. These infrastructure projects are typically financed by 
state budgets, government bonds, and official development assistances (ODAs). However, in present the 
state budgets are quite limited because national and state-owned enterprise debt loads are closely controlled. 
Attracting investment through government bonds is also considered ineffective due to their low rates of 
return and illiquidity. Since Vietnam is not an underdeveloped country anymore, the ODA funds have been 
minimal. Alternatively, the Vietnamese government has called for the participation by private entities such as 
domestic and foreign companies, and international joint venture companies. Another financing alternative is 
that government agencies cooperate with private investors in a business form called public-private 
partnership or PPP. 
Since 1993, various forms of PPP have been implemented in transportation infrastructure projects in 
Vietnam such as Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT), Build-Transfer (BT), Build-Transfer-Operate (BTO), pilot 
PPP (in 2010), and PPP (in 2015). Legislations regarding BOT, BT, and BTO (BOT/BT/BTO) projects were 
issued at the end of 2009 [1] and revised in early 2011. The government also introduced pilot PPP regulations 
[2] for a number of projects. These pilot regulations functioned as a basis for further improving mechanisms, 
policies, and regulations on the investment in the PPP form. As an effort to bridge the potential funding gap, 
the government turned to the pilot PPP form. While the existing BOT legislation is designed primarily for 
private investors, pilot PPP projects are designed to pool capitals of the public and private sectors. These 
investment capitals include state participation, which can be a portion of project funding and non-financial 
supports. The pilot PPP framework aims to attract non-governmental investment in a wide variety of public 
projects and create a framework for the government’s support where a funding viability gap exists. This PPP 
framework also facilitates the implementation of feasibility studies that form a basis for determining the 
amount and form of the government’s support and a risk-sharing mechanism among the involved parties 
prior to the selection of project investors. The pilot PPP scheme is implemented in parallel with the existing 
BOT legislation. The legal framework for the pilot PPP program is expected to form a basis for a more 
comprehensive PPP model [3]. Since then, more than 20 pilot public service and infrastructure PPP projects 
have adopted this scheme. Unfortunately, many projects have been stalled, such as Dau Giay - Phan Thiet 
Expressway – the first pilot PPP transportation project in Vietnam. Although the Vietnamese government 
committed the equality competitive level for this project by adopting the open bidding procedure, there was 
no tender. The prime minister approved the Bitexco Group as the first investor from 2007. Since then there 
has been no succeeding investor. The performance of pilot PPP transportation projects in Vietnam must 
encounter various problems such as lack of transparency in the business environment, inadequate legal 
frameworks, complex procurement procedures, and land acquisition. 
The latest regulations concerning PPP were introduced in 2015. Both public and private sectors are still 
not familiar with these new regulations [4]. The public sector has limited experience in this new PPP scheme, 
whereas it is not attractive for the private sector, which concerns about its risky investment environment. 
Although the Vietnamese government has issued various supporting and incentive policies to attract private 
investors, their interest was still dreadfully low due to a lack of appropriate incentive policies and transparent 
legal frameworks. 
Due to all reasons above, it is vital to comprehend both public and private sectors' risk perceptions so 
that the Vietnamese government can establish appropriate policies and frameworks that make PPP 
transportation projects attractive for both parties, especially private investors. Unfortunately, the number of 
research works on PPP transportation projects in Vietnam is considerably low. This paper focuses on 
identifying, assessing, and ranking the critical risks affecting the performance of previous BOT/BT/BTO 
and pilot PPP transportation projects as well as examining different risk perceptions between the public and 
private sectors. The results will be useful for both domestic and foreign participants in PPP transportation 
projects in Vietnam. 
 
2. Previous Research 
 
A number of research works have investigated various aspects of PPP. Herein, we primarily focus on risks 
associated with PPP implementation and their impacts on the performance of project participants. Analyzing 
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risks associated with PPP project development can be divided into two major stages: (1) project investment 
(e.g., expanding existing networks, constructing new facilities, or renovating existing facilities) and (2) 
operation and maintenance services. To manage PPP risks efficiently, it is necessary to identify and categorize 
risk factors. The risks of PPP projects can be divided into two main groups: the systematic risk group and 
the unsystematic risk group [5]. The systematic risk group entails risks that are beyond the control of project 
participants such as political, legal, economic, and environmental risks. The unsystematic risk group includes 
risks related to the project itself such as construction, design, operation, finance, and revenue risks. Critical 
risks encountered in the operation phase of a Bangkok expressway, a PPP project in Thailand, was 
investigated [6]. In this project, the major participants in the sponsoring consortium had left the project due 
to disputes with the granting authority regarding user fees. In addition, the government's delay on increasing 
toll fee and poor revenue directly caused cash-flow problems, which contributed to rescheduling debt 
repayment. In another study, risk factors were grouped into two main categories: the general risk and the 
project-specific risk [7]. The general risk was subdivided into political, commercial, and legal risks. Meanwhile, 
the project-specific risk, which can be controlled by stakeholders, was identified and analyzed in accordance 
with life-cycle of PPP projects: the development phase, the construction phase, and the operation phase. It 
was concluded that the private sector in Vietnam viewed BOT projects riskier than the public sector did. For 
foreign investors, nine out of ten most critical risks were in the general risk group. As a result, the BOT 
infrastructure projects in Vietnam were not quite attractive for foreign investors.  
Twenty-two risks in Indian BOT road projects were identified throughout their life-cycle [8]. Eight risks 
were listed as very critical. Among them, traffic revenue and delay in land acquisition were the most critical risks. 
Other 17 risk factors were recognized during the development phase of Indian PPP projects [9]. Risks related 
to cost overrun, delay, and financial closures have been reported to be the most critical.  
For PPP construction projects in China, seventeen critical risk factors were identified, which were 
classified into six groups: (1) macroeconomic, (2) construction and operation, (3) government maturity, (4) 
market environment, (5) economic viability, and (6) government intervention [10]. Among them, the most 
critical risks were government intervention, poor public decision-making process, government corruption, 
financing risk, inadequate law, and supervision system. These results were consistent with those of [11], which 
revealed that the intervention by the government and a poor public decision-making process were a major 
threat on the success of PPP highway projects in China. Twenty-three critical risk factors were also found 
that affect the performance of PPP projects in Singapore such as lack of support by the government, financial 
availability, construction delay, inadequate experience in PPP, and unstable government [12]. Although 
Singapore has experienced a long period of political stability, government-related issues (e.g., support and 
stability) were considered the most concerned issues by respondents. Financial capacity and the private 
sector’s experience on PPP were imperative harms to the performance of PPP projects. 
 
3. Research Methodology 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the research methodology adopted in this paper, which can be broken down into five 
steps.  
Step 1 – Compile the risk factors in PPP projects. The risk factors affecting the performance of PPP projects 
are first compiled through comprehensive literature review. These risk factors are then verified by a group of 
professionals experienced in PPP projects.  
Step 2 – Conduct a pilot interview and a questionnaire survey. A set of questionnaire survey is prepared based on 
the relevant literature and current PPP practices in Vietnam. A pilot interview and questionnaire survey are 
conducted to gather necessary information on the risk factors perceived by a group of PPP transportation 
project professionals. The questionnaire survey encompasses several issues regarding the investment in PPP 
transportation projects in Vietnam; nonetheless, this paper presents only the project risk factors. The 
preliminary questionnaire is tested to justify its relevancy. The comments and feedbacks of experienced 
professionals are used to finalize the questionnaire. 
Step 3 – Conduct a large-scale questionnaire survey. The revised questionnaire is then distributed to other 
experienced professionals in PPP transportation projects in Vietnam in a large-scale survey. To elicit the 
probability and impact of each risk factor, the respondents are asked to specify the probability (rating 1 to 5) 
and impact (rating A to E) of each risk factor, based on the five-point Likert scale. The respondents’ opinions 
are converted into numerical scales (from 0 to 1) and analyzed. 
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Step 4 – Perform risk assessment. In this paper, the risk level of each risk factor is assessed by the probability-
impact method [13]. The combined risk level (RL) of a certain risk factor can be calculated by using the following 
formula: 
 
    RL P I P I  (1) 
 
where   RL = combined risk level (on a scale of 0 to 1) 
P = probability of risk (measured on a scale of 0 to 1) 
  I = risk impact (measured on a scale of 0 to 1) 
 
All the risks are then classified into three levels: high, medium, and low. Per the results from the pilot 
interview, the boundaries between the high- and the medium-risk levels, and between the medium- and the 
low-risk levels are defined at RL = 0.80 and RL = 0.45, respectively [14], as shown in Fig. 2. 
To statistically examine the similarity and difference of the perceptions between the public and private 
sectors, an independent sample t-test is performed. Finally, risk responsive strategies are suggested by the 
respondents from the private sector. 
Step 5 – Validate the results. A group of PPP experts from the government and the private sector is invited 
to validate the results. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1.  Research methodology. 
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Fig. 2.  Risk contour diagram of low-, medium-, and high-risk levels. 
 
4. Research Data Collection 
 
To identify the risk factors in PPP transportation projects in Vietnam, risk factors in general construction 
projects presented in past research works are first examined and similar risk factors are compiled, as shown 
in Table 1. Since this research focuses on PPP transportation projects, the compiled risk factors are reviewed 
by seven experienced professionals in PPP transportation projects through in-depth interviews and verified 
with case studies. The professionals that participate in this pilot survey entail two officers from the Ministry 
of Planning and Investment, a PPP investor, a consultant, a contractor, and two university lecturers. Table 2 
provides their profiles. As can be seen, all of them have at least ten years of experience in PPP transportation 
projects in Vietnam. Each participant is provided with a list of risk factors and is asked to specify the risk 
factors that affect the performance of PPP transportation projects. According to their opinions, eight risk 
factors are removed, and three new risk factors are added to the list. Thus, 33 risk factors are affirmed by this 
group of professionals. In-depth interviews with these experts are then carried out to compile additional data 
from ten previous PPP transportation projects in Vietnam, as shown in Table 3. As can be seen, three new 
factors are added to the list, namely, unclear about state participant potion (D5), breach of contract by government (D7), 
and inadequate feasibility study (D8). A total of 33 risk factors that were encountered in these past projects are 
listed in Table 3. 
The next step is conducting a large-scale data survey. A questionnaire is prepared based on the risk factors 
previously identified. It is distributed to another group of professionals that is also experienced in PPP 
transportation projects in Vietnam, which can be categorized into the public sector and the private sector. 
The public sector entails the officers in relevant government agencies, whereas the private sector includes 
investors, consultants, contractors, financiers, and designers, who have experienced PPP projects. A total of 
320 questionnaires are distributed in Vietnam, and 123 valid responses are (38.4% response rate). The 
response rates for the public and private sectors are 20.3% and 79.7%, respectively, as shown in Table 4.  
The respondents are line directors or project managers (57.7%), directors or deputy directors (23.6%), 
and project managers (34.1%). The work experiences of the respondents are less than 10 years (43.1%) and 
10 years and more (56.9%). More than 99% of respondents have experience in one or more PPP projects. 
Clearly, these survey results can represent the opinion of a majority of PPP experts in Vietnam. 
Finally, to confirm the accuracy of the final results, three PPP experts, one from the government, and 
two from the private sector, are invited to participate in the validation process via interviews (see Table 2). 
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Table 1. Risk factors compiled from past research works. 
 
No. Risk factors 
Literature 
A B C D E F G H I J 
1 Government's intervention        
2 Delay in project approvals and permits         
3 Corruption         
4 Expropriation and nationalization (*)         
5 Political instability (*)          
6 Inadequate law and supervision system         
7 Change in laws and regulations         
8 Change in tax regulation         
9 Financial market       
10 Fluctuation of interest rate         
11 Foreign exchange fluctuations        
12 Inflation         
13 Price change (*)          
14 Insufficient financial audit (*)          
15 Poor public decision-making process        
16 Lack of transparency in bidding          
17 Subjective project evaluation method        
18 Supporting incentive of government         
19 Conflicting or imperfect contract        
20 Unfair process of selection of private sector          
21 
Inappropriate allocation of responsibility and 
risk 
        
22 Low capacity of SPV          
23 Change of project scope        
24 Land acquisition and compensation       
25 Problems due to partner's different practice        
26 Lack of supporting infrastructure        
27 Environmental protection risk        
28 Force majeure risk          
29 Material/labor non-availability (*)          
30 Completion issues         
31 Early termination of concession by 
concession company 
        
32 Toll fee issues          
33 Payment issues         
34 Demand issues       
35 Operator inability        
36 
Residual assets risk (after concession period) 
(*) 
        
37 Cost escalation risks (*)          
38 Supply risk (*)          
Reference: A = [15]; B = [8]; C [16]; D = [7]; E = [10]; F = [9]; G = [17]; H = [11]; I = [12]; and J = 
[18]. 
(*) Risk factors that are removed  
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Table 2. Profiles of the participants in the pilot study. 
 
No. Designation Organization Experience Sector 
1 Public procurement policy Ministry of Planning and Investment ≥ 10 years Public 
2 Assistant director Ministry of Planning and Investment (*) ≥ 10 years Public 
3 Representative investors PPP investor (*) ≥ 10 years Private 
4 Assistant director Consultant ≥ 10 years Private 
5 Project management Contractor ≥ 10 years Private 
6 Expert University (*) ≥ 10 years Private 
7 Project management University ≥ 10 years Private 
(*) Experienced professionals that also validate the final results 
 
5. Results and Discussion 
 
5.1. Risk Identification  
 
By reviewing various past research working, interviewing PPP professionals, and examining PPP case studies 
in Vietnam, 33 risk factors are identified, as shown in Table 3. The hierarchical risk breakdown structure 
(HRBS) is used to specify risk groups, risk categories, and risk factors. A risk code system is established to 
manage all the risk factors. As shown in Fig. 3, the risk factors are divided into two main groups:  
1) General risks, which include the risk factors associated with the PPP project’s environment. This risk 
group is subdivided into the political, legal, and commercial risk categories. 
2) Project-specific risks, which encompass the risk factors related to the PPP project's performance 
throughout its life-cycle. This risk group is divided further into the design and procurement, construction, 
and operation categories. 
 
5.2. Critical Risk Factors  
 
To investigate the effect of risk on the performance of PPP transportation projects in Vietnam, the concept 
of combined risk level (RL) is adopted to rank all the risk factors. Figure 4 displays a contour diagram, which 
displays the probabilities (P) and impacts (I) of all 33 risk factors. As can be seen, this contour diagram is 
divided into three zones, namely, the low-risk level (no risk factor), the medium-risk level (10 risk factors), 
and the high-risk level (23 risk factors). Table 5 illustrates the means and the ranks of 23 critical risk factors 
(CRFs) (RL ≥ 0.8) based on the opinions of the public sector, the private sector, and both sectors. Tables 6 
and 7 display the ranking of the probabilities (P) and impacts (I) of the six risk categories based on the 
opinions of the public sector, the private sector, and both sectors, respectively. 
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Table 3. Principal risk factors prevailed in past PPP transportation projects in Vietnam. 
 
Categories ID Risk factors 
Case No. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
G
e
n
e
ra
l 
ri
sk
s 
P
o
li
ti
c
a
l P1 Government's intervention          
P2 Delay in project approvals and 
permits   
 
  
 
 
P3 Corruption          
L
e
g
a
l 
L1 Inadequate law and supervision 
system   

     
 
 
L2 Change in laws and regulations         
 
L3 Change in tax regulation          
C
o
m
m
er
c
ia
l 
C1 Financial market        
 
 
C2 Fluctuation of interest rate        
 
 
C3 Foreign exchange fluctuations        
 
 
C4 Inflation         
P
ro
je
c
t-
sp
e
c
if
ic
 r
is
k
s 
D
e
si
g
n
 a
n
d
 P
ro
c
u
re
m
en
t 
D1 Poor decision-making process         
D2 Lack of transparency in bidding        
D3 
Subjective project evaluation 
method 
   
    


D4 Supporting incentive of 
government    

    
 
 
D5 Unclear about state participant 
portion (*) 
         
D6 Conflicting or imperfect contract        
D7 Breach of contract by 
Government (*) 

     

 
D8 Inadequate feasibility study (*)        
D9 Unfair process of selection of 
private sector         


D10 Inappropriate allocation of 
responsibility and risk 
   


  
 
 
D11 Low capacity of SPV       
C
o
n
st
ru
c
ti
o
n
 
Co1 Change of project scope         
Co2 
Land acquisition and 
compensation 
 
  
 
 
Co3 Problems due to partner’s 
different practice         


Co4 Lack of supporting infrastructure       

 
Co5 Environmental protection risk         
 
 
Co6 Force majeure risk         
O
p
e
ra
ti
o
n
 
O1 Completion issues       
 
 
O2 Early termination of concession by 
concession company 

  


 
 
O3 Toll fee issues      
 
 
O4 Payment issues        

 
O5 Demand        
 
 
O6 Operator inability          
Case 1: Binh Trieu II Road Bridge; Case 2: Yen Lenh Bridge; Case 3: Ong Thin Bridge; Case 4: Phu My 
Bridge; Case 5: BOT 1A National Highway,  An Suong – An Lac; Case 6: 13 National Highway, HCM-
Binh Duong; Case 7: 1K National Highway, HCM-Bien Hoa; Case 8: BOT My Phuoc-Tan Van 
Highway; Case 9: Deo Ca Tunnel;  Case 10: Co May Bridge 
(*) Risk factors that are added 
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Table 4. Questionnaire return rate. 
 
Stakeholder 
Questionnaire 
distributed 
Response 
received 
Response 
rate 
Proportion 
(%) 
Partner Number 
Government 
Agencies 
43 25 58.1% 20.3% Private 
sector* 
98 
Private Investors 
132 55 41.7% 44.7% Public 
sector** 
25 
Consultants 61 27 44.3% 22.0% Total 123 
Contractors 53 10 18.9% 8.1%    
Financiers 20 5 25.0% 4.1%    
Designers 11 1 9.1% 0.8%    
Total 320 123 38.4% 100.0%     
*The private sector includes private investors, consultants, contractors, financiers, and designers. 
**The public sector includes the officers in relevant government departments. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. Hierarchical risk breakdown structure (HRBS) of PPP transportation projects. 
 
 
Probability
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Fig. 4. Contour diagram containing 33 risk factors. 
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Table 5. Risk perceptions of the public and private sectors in PPP transportation projects.  
 
ID Critical risk factor (CRF) 
Overall Public sector Private sector 
Mean Rank Mean Rank Mean Rank 
Co2 Land acquisition and compensation 0.924 1 0.904 1 0.929 1 
P2 Delay in project approvals and permits 0.912 2 0.886 2 0.919 2 
D8 Inadequate feasibility study 0.878 3 0.830 7 0.891 3 
C1 Financial market 0.852 4 0.838 5 0.856 6 
D3 Subjective project evaluation method 0.851 5 0.840 3 0.854 7 
L2 Change in laws and regulations 0.847 6 0.839 4 0.849 8 
C2 Fluctuation of interest rate 0.837 7 0.799 11 0.846 9 
P3 Corruption 0.835 8 0.698 27 0.868 4 
Co1 Change of project scope 0.834 9 0.736 22 0.859 5 
D4 Supporting incentive of government 0.829 10 0.803 9 0.837 11 
D1 Poor decision-making process 0.829 11 0.801 10 0.836 12 
D10 
Inappropriate allocation of responsibility and 
risk 
0.829 12 0.787 13 0.840 10 
O5 Demand 0.828 13 0.829 8 0.827 17 
L1 Inadequate law and supervision system 0.823 14 0.790 12 0.831 13 
Co4 Lack of supporting infrastructure 0.813 15 0.766 18 0.824 18 
O1 Completion issues 0.812 16 0.780 15 0.820 19 
O4 Payment issues 0.811 17 0.739 20 0.829 15 
D2 Lack of transparency in bidding 0.811 18 0.727 25 0.831 14 
C4 Inflation 0.809 19 0.727 24 0.829 16 
O3 Toll fee issues 0.808 20 0.773 16 0.818 20 
D9 Unfair process of selection of private sector 0.804 21 0.753 19 0.816 21 
D6 Conflicting or imperfect contract 0.802 22 0.785 14 0.807 22 
D11 Low capacity of SPV 0.801 23 0.838 6 0.792 24 
 
 
Table 6. Ranking of the probabilities (P) of the six risk categories. 
 
Risk categories Overall   Public sector   Private sector 
Mean Rank   Mean Rank   Mean Rank 
Political 0.558  1  0.442  6  0.587  1 
Legal 0.494  5  0.456  4  0.504  5 
Commercial 0.532  3  0.508  1  0.538  4 
Design and Procurement 0.524  4  0.467  3  0.538  3 
Construction 0.537  2  0.486  2  0.550  2 
Operation 0.493  6   0.449  5   0.504  5 
 
Table 7. Ranking of the impacts (I) of the six risk categories. 
 
Risk categories Overall   Public sector   Private sector 
Mean Rank   Mean Rank   Mean Rank 
Political 0.664  1  0.586  4  0.684  1 
Legal 0.635  4  0.600  1  0.645  4 
Commercial 0.642  2  0.577  5  0.658  2 
Design and Procurement 0.636  3  0.595  3  0.647  3 
Construction 0.598  6  0.538  6  0.614  6 
Operation 0.616  5   0.597  2   0.620  5 
 
Based on the overall respondents’ opinions (Table 5), 23 of 33 risk factors are considered critical (RL ≥ 
0.8). However, the risk perceptions of the public and private sectors are quite different. Ten risks are 
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considered critical by the public partner, whereas 22 risks are rated critical by the private partner. Interestingly, 
the respondents from the private sector generally rate a certain risk factor with a higher risk level (RL) than 
the public sector does. This result shows that the private partner treats the PPP transportation projects in 
Vietnam riskier than the public partner does. It also confirms the result from a previous study on 
BOT/BT/BTO projects in Vietnam by Toan and Ozawa [7]. 
Considering the ranking of the probabilities (P) of the risk categories (Table 6), both public and private 
sectors quite agree on the ranks of the construction (2nd), design and procurement (3rd), and operation (5th) risk 
categories. The public sector views that the commercial risk category is most likely to occur. The political risk 
category is the most likely risk category from the private sector’s point of view, but it is the least likely from 
that of the public sector. 
For the ranking of risk impact (I) (Table 7), the private sector suggests that the political and commercial risk 
categories have the most profound impact on their execution in PPP projects (first and second ranks, 
respectively). Meanwhile, the public sector disagrees with its counterpart as they put these two risk categories 
in the fourth and fifth ranks, respectively. This ranking clearly reflects the private sector’s serious concerns 
about the country’s political stability. This is because the nation’s political stability and a transparent legal 
mechanism contribute to the investors’ willingness to invest in PPP projects. In present, the public sector 
has realized the importance of stable legal regulation and framework on the success of PPP project execution 
in Vietnam. Clearly, inadequate legal and supervision systems, changes in laws and regulations, and changes 
in tax regulation have had adverse impacts on PPP projects for decades. Thus, they need to be amended 
immediately. 
According to the overall respondents’ risk perception presented in Table 5, there are five critical risk 
factors, the means of which are greater than 0.85, namely land acquisition and compensation (Co2), delay in project 
approvals and permits (P2), inefficient feasibility study (D8), financial market risk (C1), and subjective project evaluation 
method (D3). These risk factors are considered the most critical risk factors for PPP transportation project in 
Vietnam that deserve to be investigated in detail as follows. 
 
5.2.1. Land acquisition and compensation (Co2)  
 
For both public and private sectors, this is the most critical risk factor with a probability of 0.718, an impact 
of 0.767 (highest), and an RL of 0.924 (highest). In Vietnam, land acquisition and compensation have to face with 
various challenges. For example, the compensation for land acquisition proposed by the government agency 
is always lower than the market price. Other obstacles are different compensations for different provinces 
and corruption problems during the compensation process [19, 20]. Moreover, under the pilot PPP 
regulations [2], the Provincial People’s Committees are responsible for site clearance, and the Authorized 
State is the entity party to the contract. This separation of roles and responsibilities often leads to delays in 
land clearance in practice if the coordination is inefficient [3]. Although the difficulties of land acquisition 
and compensation and their adverse impacts on PPP projects have been widely recognized, risks analysis and 
mitigation strategies were not well developed to cope with such problems [21]. The site clearance and 
compensation processes problems still continue. These problems could affect the entire schedule and viability 
of the PPP projects. Thus, the government must launch new appropriate policies to address these problems. 
 
5.2.2. Delay in project approvals and permits (P2)   
 
For most of the previous PPP projects, the Vietnamese government did not grant approvals on project-
related issues as scheduled, and sometimes they even canceled what that had already been approved [19]. The 
prolonged approval process results from incompetence and unprofessionalism of government officials, 
complex approval procedures, as well as frequent laws and regulations changes, which cause difficulty in 
implementing PPP projects.  Unfortunately, it is difficult to clearly allocate the approval and permit risk to the 
public or private sector [22]. As a result, delay in project approvals and permits is ranked as the second most critical 
risk factors for both partners. It also implies that the legal and regulations for PPP projects is seriously 
problematic in Vietnam. 
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5.2.3. Inadequate feasibility study (D8) 
 
In Vietnam, the proposal of a PPP transportation project must be assessed by the public sector first. If it is 
approved, the project will then be put into a PPP project list. Based on this list, an authorized state body will 
develop bidding documents and choose consultants to prepare feasibility study (FS) reports. A FS report 
contains such information as project risk analysis, and rights and obligations of the parties [3]. This 
information significantly contributes to the success of PPP transportation projects. According to our 
questionnaire surveys, the feasibility studies of PPP transportation projects in Vietnam are considered 
inadequate. This risk factor is in the third and seventh rank from the viewpoints of the private and public 
sectors, respectively. This probably contributes to the incapacity of FS consultants as well as different 
viewpoints and disputes between stakeholders [23]. Consequently, the FS reports require adjustments, or 
even changes, several times. To address this problem, the public and private sectors in Vietnam must focus 
on enhancing the quality of feasibility studies such as relying on qualified third-party consultants [24]. 
 
5.2.4. Financial market (C1) 
 
The evaluation of financial viability is commonly used for assessing the potential of a PPP project to achieve 
the financial targets of its various stakeholders [25]. According to our survey, the financial market risk in 
Vietnam is highly critical (fourth rank for overall). It is one of the risk factors that repel private entities to 
invest in PPP transportation projects in Vietnam. In addition to this risk factor, fluctuation of interest rate (C2) 
and inflation (C4) led to a crisis in the Vietnamese construction industry. Unfortunately, these risk factors are 
considered macroeconomic conditions, which are impossible to avoid. The fluctuation of interest rate and 
inflation would cause the undesirable financial condition for all participants in the projects, especially their 
potential profits. Furthermore, the private sector’s access to capital through loans from financial institutions 
will become much more difficult unless they get loan guarantees from the government.  
 
5.2.5. Subjective project evaluation method (D3) 
 
The PPP project evaluation encompasses such steps as determine a concession period, design a tariff 
structure, and forecast the market demand. Due to limited information, these evaluations are normally highly 
subjective. The risk level of subjective project evaluation method in PPP projects is in the fifth rank (overall). This 
result corresponds with those from previous studies (e.g., [11] and [23]). Most of the previous 
BOT/BT/BTO projects in Vietnam have been adversely affected by inappropriate concession periods and 
inaccurate market demand forecasts. For example, Phu My Bridge project (BOT) was the first cable-stayed 
bridge project in Ho Chi Minh City. After being operating for three years, the project was recently terminated 
by the concession company (Phu My Bridge Corporation, PMC) and was returned to the Vietnamese 
government. Several factors contribute to the failure of this project, including lack of supporting 
infrastructure (i.e., the public sector could not finish the eastern ring road to connect to the bridge), low 
traffic volume, low traffic revenue, all of which result from the inadequate valuation method for the project’s 
financial feasibility. Thus, the efficacy of project assessment techniques is very important for the success of 
PPP transportation projects. The subjective evaluation methods must be carefully and reasonably applied. 
 
5.3. Risk Factors in PPP Projects among Selected Countries 
 
The top five critical risk factors (CRFs) for PPP transportation projects in Vietnam, which were identified in 
the previous section, are furthered examined by investigating their criticality on PPP projects in other 
countries. Herein, we review six important research works that were conducted after the 2008 economic 
crisis, as illustrated in Table 8. Even though these studies were not identical in terms of research objectives 
and methodologies, their results can be compared to appreciate the characteristics of major risks in other 
countries.   
Based on our study, the land acquisition and compensation risk factor is the most critical risk PPP 
transportation projects in Vietnam. It mainly results from the inefficacy of legal policies and enforcement 
tools of the government. This result corresponds with those from India (4th rank) and Vietnam (2008 - 4th 
rank). In Singapore, which is a developed country, site availability (35th rank) is clearly not a dominant risk 
factor. Rather, lack of support from their government is viewed as the most critical risk factor that influences 
the performance of PPP projects in Singapore.  
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The approvals and permits issue is considered one of the most critical risk factors in Vietnam (2nd rank in 
this study) and in India (5th rank). As discussed in the previous section, the Vietnamese government did not 
grant approvals on project-related issues as scheduled, and sometimes they even cancelled what that had 
already been approved [19]. This is similar to the situation in India. In contrast, the approvals and permits 
problem was not critical for other nations such as Egypt (19th rank), Singapore (15th rank), and China (14th 
and 18th rank). 
The financial risk is dominant not only in Vietnam but also in other countries such as Egypt [foreign 
exchange (1st rank) and inflation (3rd rank)], Singapore [availability of finance (2nd rank)], China [financial risk 
(3rd rank)], India [delay in financial closure (2nd rank)], and Vietnam [2008 - financial attraction (1st rank) and 
availability of finance (2nd rank)]. In this study, the finance risk (4th rank) is specified as a risk that frequently 
occurs and has a severe impact. Thus, it often repels private businesses to participate in PPP projects in 
Vietnam.  
Inadequate feasibility study and subjective project evaluation methods are two risk factors that are newly 
acknowledged in this study. These two problems are unique for Vietnam, not in the other countries.  They 
essentially stem from lack of PPP’s experience by the public sector and an immature legal basis for PPP 
implementation, which contribute to the efficacy of PPP project evaluation methods. 
 
5.4. Risk Perceptions of the Public and Private Sectors 
 
An empirical analysis is conducted to test the consensus among the two groups of respondents (i.e., the public 
and private sectors) on their ranking using the Spearman’s rank correlation test. The relation between both 
groups’ rankings is verified by a hypothesis testing at the 1% significant level. It is found that the Spearman’s 
correlation coefficients (𝑟𝑠) for ranking of the probabilities and impacts of the risk factors between the public 
and private sectors are 0.500 and 0.673, respectively. Similarly, the Spearman’s correlation coefficient for the 
combined risk levels between the public and private sectors is 0.711. Table 9 summaries the Spearman’s rank 
correlation coefficients (𝑟𝑠) and the significant levels (Sig.). It suggests that all the null hypotheses that have 
no significant correlation between the public sector and private sector can be rejected. It should be noted 
that the probability correlation between the public and private sectors is relatively medium with 𝑟𝑠 = 0.5, 
which indicates that the agreement on the rankings of probability is considerable [26].  
The results from the Spearman’s correlation test show that the public and private respondents share a 
relatively consistent view of the ranking of risk factors in PPP projects in Vietnam. The classification of 
critical risk levels also reveals some interesting results. As illustrated in Table 5, there are 22 critical risk factors 
(CRFs) (i.e., RL ≥ 0.8) based on the perception of the private sector’s respondents whereas there are only 10 
CRFs that are recognized by the public sector’s respondents. The private sector considers corruption (P3) and 
change of project scope (Co1) as the fourth and fifth ranks, respectively.  Meanwhile, the public sector rates them 
as the 27th and 22nd ranks, respectively. Similar results are also found in lack of transparency in the bidding (D2) 
and inflation (C4). The results further unveil different perceptions of the public and private investors for the 
ranking of low capacity of concession company (D11) and demand issues (O5). Interestingly, the public sector suggests 
that corruption has no significant impact on the implementation of PPP projects, but the private sector 
expresses its serious concerns about this problem. Moreover, for the public sector, the capacity of the private 
sector and demand of projects are their critical concerns.   
In order to clarify the different perceptions of both stakeholders on the criticality of PPP project risks in 
Vietnam, their perceptions are compared through independent sample t-test method (at α = 5%). The null 
hypothesis is that there is no significant difference between the public and private sectors’ perceptions. The 
results from a cross-comparison among the respondents are shown in Fig. 5. The factors with significant 
differences between the public and private sectors under an independent t-test are displayed in Table 10, 
pertaining to the risk factors of PPP implementation in Vietnam. 
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Table 8. Comparison of CRFs among selected countries. 
 
Country Rank of critical risk factors (CRFs) 
1 2 3 4 5 
Vietnam 
(this study) 
Land acquisition 
and 
compensation 
Delay in project 
approvals and 
permits 
Inadequate 
feasibility study 
Financial market Subjective 
project 
evaluation 
methods 
Egypt 
[18] 
Foreign 
exchange 
fluctuation 
Politics Inflation Poor public 
decision making 
process 
Government 
policy 
Singapore 
[12] 
Lack of support 
from 
government 
Availability of 
finance 
Construction 
time delay 
Inadequate 
experience in 
PPP 
Unstable 
government 
China 
[11] 
Government’s 
intervention 
Poor political 
decision making 
Finance Government’s 
reliability 
Market demand 
change 
China 
[10] 
Government 
intervention 
Poor public 
decision-making 
process 
Government 
corruption 
Finance Inadequate law 
and supervision 
system 
India 
[9] 
Pre-investment Delay in financial 
closure 
Resettlement and 
rehabilitation 
Delay in land 
acquisition 
Permit/approval  
Vietnam 
[7] 
Financial 
attraction of 
project investors 
Availability of 
finance 
Time and quality Land acquisition 
and 
compensation 
Unfair process of 
selection of 
private sector 
  
Table 9. Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient test between the public and private sectors. 
 
Comparison rs Sig. Conclusion 
Public sector ranking vs. 
Private sector ranking 
Probability .500 .010 Reject Ho at 1% sig. level and thus accept H1 
Impact .673 .000 Reject Ho at 1% sig. level and thus accept H1 
Risk level .711 .000 Reject Ho at 1% sig. level and thus accept H1 
Ho = No significant correlation on the rankings of PPP risk factors between the two groups. 
H1 = Significant correlation on the rankings of PPP risk factors between the two groups. 
Reject Ho if the significant level (p-value) is less than the allowance value of 5% (2-tailed). 
 
 
 
Fig. 5. Cross-comparison of CRFs among both groups of the respondents.  
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Table 10. CRFs with significantly different risk perceptions of the public and private sectors under t-test. 
  
Risk factors Levene's test for equality of 
variances 
t-test for equality of means 
Assumption F Sig. t df Sig. 
(2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Diff. 
(*)  
Std. 
Error 
Diff. 
Private sector vs. Public sector 
P3 Corruption Equal variances 
not assumed 
14.580 .000 4.875 28.32 0.000 0.164 0.034 
Co1 Change of project 
scope 
Equal variances 
not assumed 
7.430 .007 4.267 29.49 0.000 0.122 0.029 
D2 Lack of transparency 
in bidding 
Equal variances 
assumed 
1.686 .197 3.515 121 0.001 0.099 0.028 
C4 Inflation Equal variances 
assumed 
1.730 .191 4.260 121 0.000 0.097 0.023 
O4 Payment issues Equal variances 
assumed 
3.431 .066 3.888 121 0.000 0.090 0.023 
D8 Inadequate feasibility 
study 
Equal variances 
assumed 
.003 .957 2.948 121 0.004 0.064 0.022 
D10 Inappropriate 
allocation of 
responsibility and risk 
Equal variances 
assumed 
.168 .682 3.028 121 0.003 0.055 0.018 
C2 Interest rate 
fluctuations 
Equal variances 
assumed 
1.550 .216 2.280 121 0.024 0.047 0.021 
* Mean diff. = Private Mean – Public Mean 
 
The public and private sectors are “diverse actors,” which are contractually bound to deliver “mutually 
agreed objectives” [27]. The survey data reveal that about one-third of the CRFs (8 out of 23 factors) show 
significantly different risk perceptions between the public and private participants, as shown in Table 10. 
Although the rankings of combined risk levels are different between the public and private sectors, both 
sectors agree that the land acquisition and compensation (Co2) and project approvals and permits (P2) issues are most 
critical for PPP implementation. The risk factors with greatest mean differences (MDs) between the private 
and public sectors are corruption (P3) (MD = 0.164), change of project scope (Co1) (MD = 0.122), and lack of 
transparency in bidding (D2) (MD = 0.099). The results also indicate that several risk factors entail significant 
differences in the perceptions of public and private entities such as corruption (P3), change of project scope (Co1), 
lack of transparency in bidding (D2), inflation (C4), payment risk (O4), inadequate feasibility study (D8), inappropriate 
allocation of responsibility and risk (D10), and fluctuation of interest rate (C2). These differences result from the fact 
that the public and private sectors are independent entities with different viewpoints and perspectives about 
risk factors [28]. For example, the private sector usually more focuses on the risk factors related to the 
feasibility stage of PPP projects such as feasibility study, project scope, bidding transparency, risk allocation, 
and corruption. Moreover, the private sector also concerns about some factors related to commerce and 
payment such as inflation, interest rate fluctuation, and payment. In contrast, the public sector is more 
concerned about the capacity of the private sector in PPP projects.  
Eight CRFs that indicate different risk perceptions between the public and private sectors are categorized 
into three main groups: (1) issues related to the tendering process, (2) issues related to commercial problems, 
and (3) issues related to payment problems. Their details are as follows. 
 
5.4.1. Issues related to the tendering process 
 
This group concerns lack of transparency in bidding (D2), corruption (P3), inadequate feasibility study (D8), change of 
project scope (Co1), and inappropriate allocation of responsibility and risk (D10). These issues are clearly caused by 
various activities of stakeholders and non-transparency throughout the tendering process of PPP projects. 
Normally, open competitive bidding is widely required in the PPP regulations of Vietnam. It is supposed to 
enhance the transparency of the investment environment, which will attract more potential investors. 
However, lack of transparency in the tendering process is still a very common complaint by the private sector 
[29, 30]. In Vietnam, since inequity and fraud in the tendering process is a very common problem [20], PPP 
contracts are often awarded to incapable investors. Moreover, the absence of transparent procurement 
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processes can readily result in substantial corruption [31]. The anti-corruption legal framework in Vietnam is 
considered one of the best legal frameworks in Asia. Yet, its implementation is facing such problems as lack 
of transparency, accountability, low payment for government officials, and inadequate system for holding 
officials accountable for their actions. In this research, corruption may cause a significant loss for the private 
sector (4th rank), whereas it is considered less severe by the public sector (27th rank) in PPP transportation 
projects in Vietnam. 
It is widely accepted that the feasibility study assessment is extremely crucial for PPP transportation 
projects. For the public sector in Vietnam, competent state agencies organize bidding under regulations and 
select professional consultants to assess the feasibility of PPP projects [2]. For the private sector, assessing 
the viability of PPP projects significant influences their decisions to invest [32]. The private sector then 
defines risk sharing scenarios under which the project becomes viable, incorporates risks into cash-flow 
analysis, and defines suitable risk mitigation strategies. However, the feasibility study of PPP projects in 
Vietnam is experiencing several challenges such as instable politics, the public sector having limited 
experience, undefined public contribution of funds, unrealistic forecast on future economic development and 
demand, low actual traffic revenues [19], as well as immature legal basis [3]. An example for misjudging the 
feasibility study that led to the failure of PPP projects in Vietnam is the Phu My Bridge project. Due to the 
delay of the East ring road, the actual number of traffic was lower than the forecast one. As a result, the 
revenue was not enough to pay the concessionaire’s annual debt. Moreover, some of competing alternative 
projects were approved by the Vietnamese government during the implementation of the Phu My project. 
Finally, the concession company of Phu My Bridge decided to terminate the concession and returned the 
project to the government. 
The complexity of contractual relations among stakeholders and a long concession period distinguish 
PPP projects from traditional transportation projects. They also significantly contribute to a large number of 
uncertainties and risks associated with the PPP projects [33]. Since the risk allocation frameworks in PPP 
contracts are often complicated and unclear, both public and private partners are susceptible to conflicts and 
disputes during the execution of contracts. Moreover, as discussed earlier, there are differences between the 
public and private sectors’ risk perceptions in PPP projects. The public sector often transfers most of the 
risks to the private partner, whereas the private sector is willing to take such risks, but with more incentives 
from the government. However, in Vietnam most of the risks are usually allocated to the private sector 
without guarantees from the government. To address these problems, standardized bidding documents and 
contracts should be prudently prepared by the government, which might be supported by capable 
professional consultants to attract the participation of private investors in PPP transportation projects in 
Vietnam. 
 
5.4.2. Issues-related to commercial problems 
 
This group concerns fluctuation of interest rate (C2) and inflation (C4). These issues are clearly caused by instable 
commercial factors in Vietnam. Indeed, fluctuation of interest rate and inflation led to the 2008 and 2011 
crises in the Vietnamese construction industry. The instability of interest rate and inflation contribute to the 
undesirable financial conditions of all stakeholders in PPP projects, especially their potential profit. Typically, 
both risks should be shared by both public and private sectors because a single party cannot deal with them 
alone [12, 34]. Thus, the Vietnamese government should attain appropriate policies to respond to these risk 
factors together with private investors, including risk sharing, minimum revenue guarantees, and 
compensation clauses in PPP contract. 
 
5.4.3. Issues-related to payment issues 
 
For typical PPP projects, the private sector will not earn any incomes until the operation phase. The payment 
risk occurs when the government or consumers (users) are not able to or are willing to pay due to social or 
other reasons. Thus, the unavailability of financial instruments, which leads to difficulty in financing, would 
cause project termination and loss of funds invested [12]. Besides, delays in the disbursement of the public 
sector can also lead to difficulties for private investors and PPP projects. Moreover, risks related to an 
unrealistic forecast on future demand and low actual traffic revenues could also cause payment problems 
[19]. The Yen Lenh Bridge project is a failure example of low actual traffic revenues, which affected the 
payment of BOT projects in Vietnam. Indeed, after Yen Lenh Bridge was completed, actual traffic revenues 
were lower than estimated, one year after the opening the toll fees were not enough to pay interest on the 
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concessionaire’s bank loans [19]. It means that the investment capitals cannot be returned during the 
operation stage. In order to address this problem, the Ministry of Finance reported to the government to 
switch the PPP scheme from BOT (Build-Operate-Transfer) to BT (Build-Transfer) form. As the result, Yen 
Lenh Bridge was transferred to Vietnamese government since then.  
 
5.5. Conclusion 
 
PPP has been proclaimed as a new scheme for infrastructure development in Vietnam. The 2015 PPP 
regulations along with pilot PPP projects are expected to enhance the opportunity for foreign and domestic 
investors to enter into this new market. In this paper, we examine the critical risk factors and the different 
perceptions among stakeholders related to PPP transportation projects in Vietnam. The important results 
are: (1) there are a large number of critical risk factors affecting PPP transportation projects, (2) the private 
sector treats the PPP transportation projects as riskier than the public sector does, and (3) the different risk 
perceptions between the public and private participants can be observed in the three major concern issues.  
About two-thirds of the risk factors (23 of 33 risks) are regarded as highly critical by both public and 
private sectors. Interestingly, the respondents from the private sector generally rate a certain risk factor with 
a higher risk level (RL) than the public sector does. The five most critical risk factors are: (1) Land acquisition 
and compensation, (2) Delay in project approvals and permits, (3) Inadequate feasibility study, (4) Financial 
market, and (5) Subjective project evaluation method. Clearly, most of them are related to the feasibility study 
stage of PPP projects. This is why the PPP transportation projects in Vietnam must be encountering various 
difficulties in attracting the private sector. 
Per our statistical analysis, significant differences in the perceptions of public and private entities are 
observed for eight critical risk factors (CRFs), which are categorized into three main groups: (1) tendering 
process (i.e., lack of transparency in bidding, corruption, inadequate feasibility study, change of project scope, 
and inappropriate allocation of responsibility and risk), (2) commercial problems (i.e., fluctuation of interest 
rate, and inflation), and (3) payment issues. 
These results would benefit the Vietnamese government to understand the perceptions and expectations 
of private investors. It is necessary for the government to revise their policies accordingly so that PPP 
transportation projects will become more attractive for the private sector. The important recommendations 
obtained from our study can be summarized as follows. 
- The legal framework for PPP projects should be established appropriately.  
- The government should provide good coordinating and supporting bodies for PPP projects. 
- The government should make a strong commitment to ensure competition and transparency during 
the bidding process. 
- The anti-corruption legal framework should be enforced closely to reduce the likelihood of 
corruption.  
- The government needs to make a rational long-term policy to restrict the changes in size or scope 
of PPP projects. 
- The feasibility studies of PPP projects must be carefully evaluated by the third-party consultant. In 
addition, the government should also pay attention to project proposals from the private sector. 
- A risk should be allocated to the party that has the best capacity and is willing to manage it. The 
government also needs an appropriate policy for sharing some critical risks with the private sector. 
The stakeholders’ risk allocation for such critical risk factors in Vietnam’s PPP transportation projects 
should be analyzed in future research works. Moreover, the risk mitigation strategies of the public and private 
sectors should be also identified and analyzed. These results would benefit the government and private 
investors in the negotiation or feasibility stage, which a critical stage of PPP transportation projects, by 
reducing time and cost for negotiation. 
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